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Recent changes in healthcare, particularly in the financial
arena, have had a profound impact on hospitals. Empirical
studies and innumerable anecdotal accounts lead commenta-
tors to conclude that the American hospital is a troubled insti-
tution.1 Between 1980 and 1989, low profit margins and
competition for patients, physicians, and managed care con-
tracts largely contributed to the closure of 698 hospitals.2
Deciphering the reasons for the current status of the
American hospital industry is a challenging task. Clearly, mul-
tiple factors have affected, and continue to affect, acute care
institutions. Elements contributing to the downturn of hospi-
tals include the following: rising labor costs; the shifting focus
from medical treatment to ambulatory care; the uncontrolled
diffusion of new, high cost technology; and changes in reim-
bursement policies by both government and the private sector.3
Significant differences among hospitals by type and location
further complicate the analysis of a hospital's economic posi-
* This Article will explore, from a legal perspective, the dynamics of the changing
relationships between hospitals and their medical staffs. Specifically, the Article will
discuss hospital strategies for maximizing the efficiency of their medical staff
operations. In this regard, the discussion will encompass two general areas: (1) the
use of agreements and policies that restrict access to medical staff membership; and,
(2) the development of economic criteria to assess physicians for appointment and
reappointment to medical staffs. Both of these general areas of discussion entail
significant legal issues that have never been extensively explored and hold the
potential to reshape the balance of hospital operations.
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tion. These differences affect both the cause and the nature of
the specific problems institutions face.
Their failure to serve a single constituency is an additional
factor complicating the analysis of hospitals. Granted, a hospi-
tal's overriding mission is to provide patient care services. But,
to successfully accomplish that goal and still remain fiscally
viable, other parties must be considered. For example, hospi-
tals compete for physician referrals. Thus, it is essential for
institutions to attract and retain doctors on their staffs who
will favorably impact the bottom line.4 In addition, hospitals
serve government regulators, third-party payors, managed care
plans, investors, donors, unions, community organizations, and
others. 5 The attempt to serve multiple constituencies has com-
plicated hospital operations and has created uncertainty over
what the primary objectives of an acute care facility should be.
As this environment within which hospitals function has
changed, there also has been a related change in the manner in
which acute care facilities are managed. The past twenty years
have witnessed a growing professionalization of hospital man-
agement.' Today's hospital executives are students of modern
management. As a result, external and internal hospital oper-
ations reflect a growing level of business sophistication. One
author has convincingly argued, that, in spite of severe eco-
nomic pressures, hospitals in the 1990s are far more efficient
than they have been in the past.7
While hospitals have undergone their own changes, signifi-
4. Millenson, Hospitals Woo Doctors to Win Patients, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 12,
1989, at 1, col. 1.
5. Stravic, Market and Market Segment Portfolio Assessment for Hospitals,
HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT REV. 25-32 (Summer 1989).
6. Longest, The Contemporary Hospital Chief Executive OffIcer, HEALTHCARE
MANAGEMENT REV. 43-53 (Spring 1978).
7. Kaner, Really Managing: The Work of Effective CEOs in Large Health Care
Organizations, HEALTH ADMIN. PRESS 1988. Clearly, management practices have had
to change in response to regulation, accreditation, and more importantly, marketplace
pressures. For instance, the dawn of hospital marketing is a direct reflection of the
growth of competition. Additionally, implementation of more sophisticated
management information systems is, in fact, a reaction to the DRB reimbursement
system. For information on hospital marketing, see Clarke, ch. 13 to L. WOLPER & J.
PINA, HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (1987); see also Toplansky, Physicians and Their
Hospitals: A Marketing Partnership, HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT REV. 58-63 (Fall
1987). For information on the impact of DRGs, see Crawford & Fotter, The Impact of
Diagnosis Related Groups and Prospective Pricing Systems on Health Care
Management, HEALTHCARE REV. (1985). For information on hospital management
information systems, see Brightbill, Systems Departments Get in Shape for the Quality
Weigh-In, Healthweek Dec. 17, 1990, at 15, 18-19.
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cant changes have also occurred in the organization of service
delivery. Reorganization has resulted in the development of
new and revised services, particularly in ambulatory and surgi-
cal care.' Few of the changes in hospital operations have been
either original or successful. But compared to the past, we
have witnessed a high level of creativity and innovation as
administrators struggle to meet the demands of multiple
constituencies.
Interestingly however, in spite of the changes in hospital
operations, the basic structure of the American hospital has
not changed. The so-called "three-legged stool" of hospital
organization, namely, the administration, the board, and the
medical staff, still provides the primary, if not the only, model
that underlies the core structure of acute care facilities.9 This
structure, blessed by tradition and sanctioned by law, is rarely
questioned. While the three-part structure may serve the
interests of physicians, and to a some extent trustees, it is
questionable whether, in the current economic climate, it
always serves the best interests of the hospital corporation.
From a management standpoint, the tripartite arrangement in
practical terms means that administrators must always work
through the medical staff and through the board to effectuate
institutional changes.
Perhaps historically, the split among administration,
board, and medical staff served to create a workable balance in
which business issues could be separated from medical ones.
However, in the current hospital milieu where facilities have
become direct providers of service, it is more difficult to draw
sharp lines between managerial and medical functions. As hos-
pital management seeks to expand institutional health care
roles and enter into new service areas, both individual physi-
cians and the medical staff as a whole see their positions as
being directly threatened.' °
Despite their lack of control over society and governmen-
tal pressures, physicians have considerable power over hospi-
tals by virtue of hospitals' dependence on them for economic
8. House, A Foroard Move in Medicine-Ambulatory Care, NURSE MANAGEMENT
88, July 1989; see also Durant, Ambulatory Surgery Centers: Surviving, Thriving into
the 1990s, J. OF MED. GROUP MANAGEMENT, 14-20 Mar.-Apr. 1989.
9. Johnson, Revisiting the Wobbly Three-Legged Stool, HEALTHCARE
MANAGEMENT REV. 15-22 (1979).
10. McDermott, The New Challenge: Organizing and Managing Physician
Organizations, 3 HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT REv. 57-61 (1988).
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survival.'- Physicians have never seen hospitals as having con-
trol over their medical practices. Instead, they have viewed
themselves as customers who are willing to take their business
elsewhere if they aren't satisfied with conditions in a particular
institution. 2 From a legal standpoint, common law, statutory
law, and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health
Organizations ("JCAHO") accreditation standards, buttress the
medical staff as a self-governing entity, and give physicians col-
lectively even more leverage against the hospital. 3
Governing boards also have tended to side with physicians,
viewing them as "surrogate customers" of the institution. Con-
sequently, they are cautious in adopting policies that alienate
medical staffs.'4 Generally, when hospital administrators and
the medical staff disagree, the board tends to side with the lat-
ter group. Historically, hospital trustees have been relatively
uninvolved in the details of either administration or medical
affairs.'" Thus, although there has been some shift in trustees'
roles as the enterprises they oversee have become increasingly
complex, it seems unlikely that greater involvement will move
boards toward a closer allegiance with administrators. While
skillful executives may be able to "manage" their boards, it
would be rare for a hospital CEO to have the same influence
over a hospital corporation as his counterpart in industry.
The optimal situation is one in which the hospital and its
medical staff are able to work in sync by reaching a consensus
about future directions. The pressures of the current environ-
ment make it difficult for hospital management and medical
staff to develop an agenda that simulataneously promotes insti-
tutional interests and protects physician autonomy and medical
staff status quo. All too often, it appears that management and
medical staff are working at cross purposes, and may in fact be
pursuing courses that conflict. The challenge faced by hospital
managers is to make and implement sound business strategies
within the constraints of the hospital's corporate structure. By
and large, the key challenge of hospital administration is to
11. Shortell, Economic Regulation and Hospital Behavior: The Effects on Medical
Staff Organization and Hospital-Physician Relationships, HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH Vol. 20, No. 6, Dec. 1985.
12. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 18-19.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 16-17.
15. Meighan, Hospital-Physician Relationships: Some Factors Beneath the
Surface, MED. STAFF COUNSELOR 48, 50-51, Summer 1987.
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work with the medical staff in a constructive manner and to
pursue options that will insure institutional survival.
Hospitals have implemented a number of strategies to cre-
ate unity with their medical staffs.'6 For example, some have
attempted to facilitate better working relationships by
expanding hospital boards to include more physician represent-
atives. Similarly, many institutions have created positions for
corporate medical directors to act as liaisons between manage-
ment and doctors.' 7 A more complex way of fostering unity is
through the myriad of joint venture arrangements between
hospitals and medical staffs which act to align the economic
interests of the parties.' 8 Still other institutions utilize hospi-
tal recruitment and staff development to attract and retain
physicians who will benefit an institution financially.' 9
Beyond joint efforts with medical staffs, hospital managers
are exploring arrangements that are mutually beneficial with
one or more physician staff members. Hospitals commonly
enter into exclusive contracts for certain core hospital services
such as radiology or pathology, or for specialized surgical serv-
ices that require considerable capital investment.20 The exclu-
sive contract is a way for a hospital to establish greater control
over the service in question, to enhance efficiency and quality,
and to restrict the provision of services to those physicians
whose practices are cost effective.
Related to exclusive contracting, some hospitals simply
decide to close membership in one or all departments.2 '
Another practice, often divisive to medical staffs, that is moti-
vated strongly by economics, involves appointment and reap-
pointment processes that utilize economic efficiency measures.
Finally, peer review programs which focus increasingly on
16. Smith, Reid, & Piland, Managing Hospital-Physician Relations: A Strategy
Scorecard, 15 HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT REV. 23-33, No. 4 (1990).
17. Betsen, Physician Managers: A Description of Their Job in Hospitals &
Health Services Administration, J. OF AM. COLLEGE OF HEALTH EXECUTIVES 353-69,
Fall 1989.
18. Gleason & Sullivan, Physician-Hospital Joint Ventures Addresses Mutual
Needs, 67 HEALTH PROGRESS at 55-67, Dec. 1986.
19. Wedig, Physician Bending: Nice or Necessary, HOSPITAL STRATEGY Report 1,
5-7, Feb. 1989; see also Dismike, Maximizing Physician Recruitment Efforts in Today's
Competitive Environment, MEDICAL STAFF COUNSELOR 43-49, Summer 1989.
20. Holthaus, Enter Exclusive Contracts for Right Reasons, HOSPITALS 63, Apr. 20,
1989; see also Scott, Chenin, Exclusive Contracts and Hospital Privileges, THE MED.
STAFF COUNSELOR 1-7, Winter 1989.
21. Closed Medical Staffs 38 TRUSTEE 58, Sept. 1985.
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practice efficiency measures can be a threat to physicians. 2
Clearly, avenues followed by hospital management that
threaten medical staffs' independence, even if they are eco-
nomically compelling, are subjects of considerable controversy.
Individual medical staffs and organized medicine traditionally
have pursued various strategies geared toward optimizing the
financial position of physicians and, more importantly, protect-
ing autonomy.2 Medical staffs threatened by aggressive hospi-
tal management have sought outside legal representation and,
when they felt it necessary, have mounted legal challenges.
Some medical staffs have formed independent associations and
conduct themselves akin to bargaining units.24 With the
expansion of hospital efforts to increase the economic effi-
ciency of physicians, there has been a notable strain placed on
institutional-medical staff relations. 5
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to present a
detailed exploration of the legal status of a hospital medical
staff, some explanation is in order. A medical staff is a type of
unincorporated association whose legal framework has been
shaped primarily by state law.26 By and large, state laws
require that hospital medical staffs be self-governing entities
within a hospital corporation.2 According to the JCAHO, a
medical staff is the entity which has overall responsibility for
the quality of professional services, and as such, controls physi-
cian staff appointments, reappointments, delineation of privi-
leges and a variety of peer review processes (i.e., surgical
review, drug use evaluation, clinical record review). 21
Medical staffs have become powerful and unique entities
as a result of several factors in the development of hospitals.
22. Hershey, Medical Staff and Hasp. Accountability, MED. STAFF COUNSELOR 1-7,
Winter 1989.
23. Id.
24. Pearlman, Carlisle Hospital Medical Staff Incorporates, PENNSYLVANIA MED.,
May 1984; see also Chenin, The Incorporated Medical Staff-An Old Solution to a New
Problem, MED. STAFF COUNSELOR, 42-47, Summer 1987.
25. Johnson, CEO's Support Tougher Physician Screening Criteria, HOSPITALS 60,
June 5, 1990; see generally MEDICAL STAFF SECTION, JOINT COMMISSION ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALiTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS 1991 [hereinafter JCAHO ACCREDITATION CRITERIA].
26. Nodzenski, A Critical Analysis off the Se~f-Governing Medical Staff (to be
published) - OKLA. L. REV., -, 1991 (in press).
27. See JCAHO ACCREDITATION CRITERIA, Supra note 25, at 99; see also JOINT
TASK FORCE REPORT ON HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF RELATIONSHIPS OF THE AMA AND
AHA (1985).
28. See JCAHO ACCREDITATION CRITERIA, supra note 25.
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Historically, hospitals were viewed as custodial facilities, shells
in which medicine was practiced, and hospital administration
only had authority to manage the business side of the opera-
tion.29 Reinforcing this separation was a doctrine banning the
corporate practice of medicine which created a legal barrier
against a hospital directly providing medical care. ° Against
this legal background of constriction in the hospital role, the
organized medical staff developed, and its role was incorpo-
rated into law and accreditation standards. While the legal
realities that existed when the medical staff structure evolved
have dramatically changed, the core structure of a hospital, as
mentioned, has not been fundamentally altered. But as also
noted, there are significant, current pressures on the medical
staff structure that call into question its long-term viability.
II. RESTRICTING ACCESS TO THE MEDICAL STAFF
Statistics on medical staffs are not particularly good. Con-
sequently, it is difficult to gauge how many hospitals have
developed policies which allow for closed departments, or have
entered into exclusive contracts for specialty services. Anecdo-
tal evidence leads one to conclude that such policies are not
uncommon. There are various reasons for limiting access to a
medical staff through closure of a department or through
exclusive arrangement. The primary factors motivating such
limitations revolve around economics and quality of care.
More specifically, the reason usually given for limiting medical
staff membership is the increased profit from having the best
physicians available to perform certain services. In addition,
restrictions on staff membership are buttressed by the need to
run a more efficient operation in that open staffing often
makes scheduling and coordination of patient care difficult.
Also, physical restrictions in a given facility may make it diffi-
cult to accommodate more staff.
While a hospital may benefit from limiting staff in a par-
ticular area, and physicians generally recognize the need to do
so, such arrangements can be divisive. Those physicians who
are parties to exclusive agreements or who are members of
closed departments clearly stand to gain financial advantages
29. A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
346 (1978).
30. Wiorek, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: An Outmoded Theory in Need of
Modification, 8 J. OF LEGAL MED. 465 (1987).
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at the expense of other practitioners. Hospital-imposed limita-
tions on staff membership are often viewed as arrangements
that circumvent medical staff credentialing authority in that
such restrictions shift staffing decisions to hospital manage-
ment. 1 Where an exclusive contract results in a limitation on
staffing in a specialty area, the arrangement will make staff
privileges moot for those specialists not included in the respec-
tive contract.
Limitations on staffing, whether in the form of exclusive
contracts or closed department arrangements, are clearly inter-
related strategies. However, from a legal standpoint, the
nature of the challenges against medical staff restrictions are
virtually identical, regardless of the arrangement in question.
Physicians injured by exclusive contracts or closed department
staff policies have argued that such arrangements violate due
process rights, constitute a breach of contract, or constitute a
tortious interference with practice. In addition, restrictions on
access to medical staff membership raise the specter of anti-
competitive behavior, and as such, are subjects of antitrust
challenge. Several cases, discussed below, have dealt specifi-
cally in these various ways with the problems of medical staff
restrictions.
Of the recent cases challenging closed medical staff
department policies, one of the most noteworthy is the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision in Desai v. St. Barnabas Medi-
cal Center.32 Desai is important not only because it is one of
the few state supreme court opinions in this subject area, but it
comes from a court that has established a tradition of leader-
ship in the area of hospital law.
The Desai case arose out of a hospital's response to a prob-
lem of overcrowding and overutilization. In 1969, St. Barnabas
Medical Center, a 705-bed hospital, adopted a closed staff pol-
icy restricting the admission of new physicians onto its staff.33
The St. Barnabas policy was not an absolute ban, as new staff
could be admitted if one or more of six criteria were met. The
specific criteria included the following: a need for the spe-
cialty, available hospital space, a special expertise, the specialty
in question not currently represented, lack of privileges else-
where, and the fact that the applicant was joining the practice
31. See supra note 20.
32. 103 N.J. 79, 510 A.2d 662 (1986).
33. Id. at 84 n.1, 510 A.2d at 664.
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group of a physician on staff.34 The trial court found that asso-
ciation with a current staff member was the key factor in
determining a new applicant's success.
35
In July of 1978, Dr. Mahesh Desai, a board certified inter-
nist and gastroenterologist, applied for staff privileges at St.
Barnabas. The hospital rejected Desai's application. The hos-
pital stated that the facility lacked sufficient beds, and that the
applicant did not add any new skills to the hospital staff. The
plaintiff resubmitted his application on three occasions, and
was turned down each time for the same reasons. Eventually,
Desai sued, alleging that the hospital's criteria which limited
access to staff membership were arbitrary and capricious and
thus illegal.
In analyzing the plaintiffs' claim, the New Jersey Supreme
Court found extensive state judicial and legislative authority
supporting a wide range of hospital discretion in managing its
affairs, including medical staff appointments. The court found
that institutional discretion is checked by a hospital's obliga-
tion to act as a public fiduciary.36 As such, the Desai court
held that if hospital management decisions reasonably serve
public health purposes, they should not be overturned.
The state supreme court analyzed the St. Barnabas staff-
ing limitations under the litmus test of reasonableness. The
court concluded that in spite of legitimate disagreement over
whether there was overcrowding at the hospital, the institu-
tion's decision to limit medical staff membership was appropri-
ate.3 7 The court did not agree, however, that the exception to
the staff closure policy based on association with a current
staff member was a reasonable way to foster the public's
health.' Rather, the Desai court saw the association exception
as a form of discrimination that the hospital was not able to
justify with any competent evidence, and thus, it failed to meet
the standard of reasonableness.
As noted, the decision in Desai comes from a court that is
among the most active in the nation in the area of hospital law.
While the public fiduciary analysis of the New Jersey courts is
unique, Desai is a significant case in establishing rather broad
34. Id.
35. Id. at 95, 510 A.2d at 670.
36. Id. at 88, 510 A.2d at 668.
37. Id. at 94, 510 A.2d at 669, 670.
38. Id. at 95-97, 510 A.2d at 670-71.
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parameters within which hospitals can make decisions to limit
staff membership. The New Jersey Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to meddle in a hospital's internal affairs is a common
judicial reaction. As long as a legitimate rationale can be iden-
tified for policies that restrict medical staff membership, courts
will hesitate to intervene even if individual physicians are hurt
by such policies.
Clearly in Desai, St. Barnabas crossed the line of reasona-
bleness by allowing a loophole in its staff restriction policies
that only served to foster the economic interests of its current
staff members and not the public policy interests that underlie
hospital operations in New Jersey. Interestingly, while the
other exceptions developed by St. Barnabas appeared to be
acceptable on public policy grounds, each of those exceptions,
individually and collectively, could mask underlying economic
motivations. As a result, they could actually have nothing to
do with fostering the public good. For example, the exception
allowing physicians with privileges in no other facilities to be
granted appointment can be seen not only as a publicly moti-
vated gesture, but also as a way to selectively foster an exclu-
sive alliance with physicians whose loyalty may yield financial
benefit to the institution.
In California, the other state court system that has devel-
oped an extensive body of hospital law, medical staff chal-
lenges against hospitals have been a frequent subject of
litigation. The position of the California courts towards closed
medical staff policies was articulated in the 1978 appellate
court opinion of Lewin v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Orange.3 9
Plaintiff, Dr. Lewin, had sought privileges in St. Joseph's
chronic hemodialysis facilities. Dr. Lewin was rejected, not
because he lacked qualifications, but rather because the hospi-
tal ran the unit as a "closed staff" operation. Lewin sued,
arguing that the institution's policy interfered with his ability
to practice medicine, and further, that the hospital had acted in
an arbitrary manner not supported by evidence.40 The trial
court agreed with Lewin's contentions, but the opposite conclu-
sion was reached at the appellate level. The appellate court
was impressed by the fact that the hospital's executive commit-
tee had carefully considered the question of an open versus a
39. 82 Cal. App. 3d 368, 146 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1978).
40. Id. at 380, 381, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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closed staff in a hemodialysis unit.4 1 There was adequate evi-
dence demonstrating that a closed staff was the preferred
option from both an administrative and a quality of care stand-
point. The court found particularly persuasive the fact that
the closed staff policy was allowed for services to be provided
at lower costs.' Moreover, plaintiff Lewin did not question
the efficiency and quality of the hemodialysis unit; in fact, he
was attracted to it because of its reputation and felt that it
should have been an open staff unit.
The appellate court in Lewin resolved the legal contro-
versy by assessing whether the institution's governing body
had the authority to adopt a closed departmental policy. Based
on precedent, the court concluded that hospital boards could
limit access to a medical staff.43 The Lewin court's assessment
of the hospital's decision to close the hemodialysis unit as a
socially responsible decision tipped the balance in favor of the
hospital." In addition, the injury to Dr. Lewin's practice was
very minimal because he held multiple hemodialysis privileges
elsewhere.
If Lewin had no other practice options and if the hospital
had intentionally hindered his practice, the plaintiff doctor
may have had a viable case. However, the court indicated that
as long as the hospital acted lawfully, with adequate justifica-
tion, the institution's right to maintain a closed staff policy
would be protected, even if the adverse effect on Lewin had
been more severe.45 In effect, the Lewin court's position
requiring proof of institutional policy justifications is quite sim-
ilar to that articulated in Desai. Although Desai rests on a
concept of public policy, the California court's acceptance of a
hospital policy that is reasonable from a business standpoint
fits within a similar analysis of fiduciary obligations.
While exclusive contracts are very closely related to closed
staff policies, there are differences. A closed staff policy is typ-
ically motivated by an oversupply of physicians which occurs as
a result of physical limitations in a particular facility. As a
management tool, closing an entire department or staff may be
a rather harsh measure, although it may appeal to medical
staff as a way to stem competition. It is possible to reach the
41. Id. at 389, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 391, 392, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
44. Id. at 390, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
45. Id. at 391, 392, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 906, 907.
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same outcome in a more selective fashion by restricting the
granting of new privileges in a particular area. Thus, exclusive
contracting is a more targeted way to reduce the size of a medi-
cal staff. While the primary motivation behind exclusive con-
tracting is quality, it also insures that only cost-effective
specialists in certain areas (i.e., radiology, pathology, anesthesi-
ology, surgery) practice in a particular facility. Additionally,
from a business standpoint, it affords management with an
additional level of control, beyond credentialing.
In the area of exclusive contracts, the New Jersey
Supreme Court decision of Belmar v. Cipolla,l which pre-
dated Desai, provides an instructive example of how the courts
have viewed such arrangements. In Belmar, two anesthesiolo-
gists challenged an exclusive contract between an anesthesia
group and a hospital parent corporation, Community Hospital
Group Inc. of J.F.K. Community Hospital. The plaintiff physi-
cians argued that the exclusive contract entered into between
the defendants and the Community Hospital Group was illegal
in that it violated New Jersey public policy and also violated
the state's antitrust laws.47
The facts underlying the challenge in Belmar unfolded
over the course of several years. For the sake of administra-
tive efficiency, the Community Hospital board decided to oper-
ate the department of anesthesiology under an exclusive
contract. The contract was awarded to a partnership of three
physicians who employed Dr. Belmar as an anesthesiologist for
ten years. The arrangement with the plaintiff ended as he and
two other physicians formed a second partnership. The hospi-
tal trustees intervened, voting to continue the contract with
the original group, thus excluding the plaintiffs from perform-
ing anesthesia services at the hospital.
Analyzing whether or not exclusive contracts violated pub-
lic policy, the New Jersey Supreme Court followed a line of
reasoning identical to that it would later adopt in Desai,
namely, that hospitals are institutions that will be judged on
whether they act in the public's interest.4 Following prior
cases and New Jersey statutory law, the Belmar court con-
cluded that an institution could not arbitrarily exclude quali-
46. 96 N.J. 199, 475 A.2d 533 (1984).
47. Id. at 212, 475 A.2d at 540.
48. Id. at 208, 475 A.2d at 538.
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fied physicians from hospital medical staffs.4" On the other
hand, the court recognized, as have other New Jersey courts,
the need to give the hospital administration wide discretion in
managing the internal affairs of the institution, including staff-
ing. In reconciling public interest concerns with managerial
discretion, the court stated that hospital actions in entering
into an exclusive contract were reasonable and motivated by a
desire to insure quality medical care.' The court rejected the
argument that exclusive contracts violated public policy and
saw the limitation on staff access for other anesthesiologists as
an appropriate management decision.
The plaintiff physicians argued that the exclusive contract
constituted an illegal tying arrangement resulting in a per se
violation of New Jersey antitrust law.5' Their allegations pos-
ited that the Community Hospital Group had unlawfully tied
the sale of other hospital services, particularly surgery, to the
sale of anesthesiological services. The New Jersey court relied
heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion of Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2. v. Hyde52 in analyzing the plaintiff's
claim. According to the Supreme Court, the key factor under-
pinning illegality in alleged hospital tying arrangements in a
per se analysis is proof that the hospital employed its market
power to force patients to use an unwanted anesthesiologist in
order to obtain needed hospital services.' Arguing that the
per se analysis should be abandoned in favor of weighing the
issues of economic impact and potential benefits of the tie-in,
Justice O'Connor in Hyde, questioned whether the relationship
between surgery and anesthesiology was a tie-in.' Justice
O'Connor correctly pointed out that surgical patients rarely
request specific anesthesiologists.' Further, she argued that
even if such a relationship was a tie-in, there is no evidence
that it has adverse effects on patients.,s
The Belmar court concluded that the antitrust claim was
not a per se violation, but rather that under a rule of reason,
the competitive and anticompetitive impacts had to be assessed.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 211, 475 A.2d at 539.
51. Id. at 212, 475 A.2d at 540.
52. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
53. Id. at 9-18.
54. Id. at 43-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 43-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The plaintiff had not produced conclusive evidence defining
the market area for anesthesiological services, nor was there
evidence about how the exclusive contract affected consumers'
demand for specific anesthesiologists. Even if JFK Hospital
had increased the number of anesthesiologists, the court noted
that it wasn't clear whether patients would actually be able to
exercise a wider range of choice. 57 The evidence of anticompe-
tiveness flowing from a tie-in at JFK was not strong enough to
warrant a violation of antitrust law under a rule of reason test,
and consequently, the plaintiff physicians' claim was rejected.
Recently, the California courts have been confronted with
legal challenges against physician contracts that severely lim-
ited non-party physicians' ability to practice in a particular
facility. In the most noteworthy of the recent exclusive con-
tracting cases, Redding v. St. Francis Medical Center,' the
plaintiffs, two cardiac surgeons, challenged a hospital's decision
to enter into an exclusive contract for heart bypass surgery
with one surgeon, who was responsible for directing and staff-
ing the program. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged breach of
contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, neg-
ligent interference with prospective economic advantage, inter-
ference with present and future contractual rights and
professional relationships, and unfair competition."
Both plaintiff physicians in Redding had been active staff
members at St. Francis for a number of years and had per-
formed the majority of coronary bypass surgeries in the hospi-
tal. In 1986, the hospital's executive committee became
concerned about the unacceptably high mortality rates in
bypass surgery. Quality problems were identified in the unit,
and after studying the problem, the hospital concluded that the
open staffing policy in the bypass area was the cause. The hos-
pital did not question the clinical performance of either plain-
tiff. However, each physician did refuse to direct a closed
bypass program because both surgeons wanted to maintain
multiple hospital privileges.
Following the reasoning of the Lewin court, and of other
courts deciding related California hospital cases, the Redding
Court recognized that a physician's relationship with a hospital
could only be interfered with for a legitimate reason (i.e. qual-
57. Belmar v. Cipolla, 96 N.J. 199, 218-19, 475 A.2d 533, 543 (1984).
58. 208 Cal. App. 3d 98, 255 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1989).
59. Id. at 100, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
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ity, managerial efficiency).' In fact, the California courts have
elevated medical staff privileges to the level of a protectable
property right.61 Still, the California courts have allowed hos-
pitals to enter into exclusive contractual arrangements. And,
as noted in Redding, such arrangements would only be set
aside if they are found to be irrational, unlawful, contrary to
public policy, or procedurally unfair.62
While the Redding court agreed with the plaintiffs that
their privileges were property rights, it did not endorse the
argument that years of staff membership gave the plaintiff sur-
geons a vested, permanent right to practice at St. Francis. On
the contrary, the court concluded that it would be detrimental
to patients and to society to prevent hospitals from making
reasonable management decisions by giving physicians a vested
or permanent interest in indefinite continuation of hospital
staff privileges.' The court reasoned that a better approach
would rest on a traditional balancing of conflicting interests."
Balancing the interests of the parties, the Redding appellate
court, as the trial court, concluded that the hospital's desire to
improve quality, particularly to reduce mortality rates, out-
weighed any potential adverse economic impact on physi-
cians.6' The court ruled in favor of St. Francis and indicated
that the record demonstrating a need for change in the bypass
area was strong enough to support the institution's decision.
The court also indicated that failure to allow the hospital to
enter into an exclusive contract would amount to a violation of
public policy.66
The issue of the legality of a hospital's exclusive contract
was again reviewed by a California court in the case of Mateo-
Woodburn v. Fresno Community Hospital (FCH).Y7 Up until
1985, the FCH department of anesthesiology was run on an
open staff basis, allowing anesthesiologists to have their pick of
cases on a rotating basis. The hospital was concerned about the
inefficiencies of such a system and its adverse impact on qual-
ity. Consequently, subsequent to a medical staff recommenda-
60. Id. at 103, 104, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
61. Id. at 105, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
62. Id. at 104, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
63. Id. at 106, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 108, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
67. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1169, 270 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1990).
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tion the hospital created a task force to study the possible
closure of the anesthesia department. A series of meetings
were held in which the pros and cons of closing the anesthesia
department were publicly considered, after which the hospi-
tal's board adopted a proposal endorsing departmental closure.
In June of 1985, FCH entered into an agreement with anesthe-
siologist Haas that allowed his professional corporation to have
exclusive control over the department. This agreement ena-
bled him to subcontract with other medical staff anesthesiolo-
gists who belong to the medical staff. Five anesthesiologists,
all highly qualified members of the FCH staff, refused to sign a
contract with Haas and challenged the legality of the hospital
arrangement.
The plaintiffs in Mateo-Woodburn complained that the
exclusive contract for anesthesiology deprived them of their
fundamental and vested right to practice.' Drawing on Cali-
fornia precedent, the appellate court concluded that a hospital
board can make a legislative or administrative decision to close
membership in a department, as long as such conduct is the
result of a rational policy and isn't an attempt merely to
exclude a particular type of physician. The Mateo-Woodburn
court viewed reorganizing services, in this case, anesthesiology,
as a reasonable management decision, particularly in view of
evidence demonstrating serious problems in the department.
The plaintiffs raised several arguments, one of which
asserted that the hospital could not reorganize a department
without having the medical staff amend its bylaws. In addi-
tion, plaintiffs argued that enabling the exclusive contractor,
Haas, to subcontract with other anesthesiologists was an illegal
delegation of medical staff authority to make appointments.69
The court rejected both contentions, pointing out that Haas did
not involve himself in issuing credentials but limited his con-
tractual agreements to anesthesiologists who had staff appoint-
ments.70  Secondly, the court reiterated a fundamental
principle of hospital law that while a medical staff has the
power to make appointment-reappointment recommendations,
the actual appointment decision is made by the institution's
board of trustees.71 Further, the Mateo-Woodburn court
68. Id. at 1182, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 900-01.





strongly endorsed the right of hospital management to elimi-
nate organizational deficiencies by making changes in the
interests of safety, efficiency and quality care.72
In balance, review of case law dealing with exclusive con-
tracts shows that decisions to close departments and medical
staffs have been upheld by the courts. It appears that as long
as there are legitimate business or quality of care reasons to
limit access to medical staffs, those decisions by hospital man-
agement will be upheld. Clearly, scenarios could be con-
structed in which exclusive arrangements breach contracts,
constitute tortious interference or violate antitrust law, but
such situations would be unusual. One issue not dealt with
here concerns the relationship between exclusive contracts and
the ability of physicians to retain medical staff privileges once
their hospital agreements are terminated; this area ought to be
dealt with in the language of the respective contract, but on
occasion is not. 3
III. THE REVERSE KICKBACK
An emerging and still novel issue in exclusive contracts
concerns the impact of the Medicare Fraud and Abuse law74 on
such arrangements with hospital based specialists. Under the
Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Kickback Law,75 Congress created a
very broad proscription against knowingly and willfully offer-
ing, paying, or soliciting any remuneration for patient refer-
rals. The law is fairly expansive, and judicial interpretation
has made it clear that violations do not need to be intentional,
nor can the alleged violations be justified by arguing that other
legitimate factors are present.76 To help providers navigate the
shoals of this rather nebulous law, the Department of Health
and Human Services ("DHHS") is creating so called "safe
harbors" that will give some guidance as to what practices are
acceptable, at least in a general sense.77 But until the safe
72. Id.
73. See A~fredson v. Lewisburg Community Hospital, No. 01-S-019002CV00022
(Tenn. March 4, 1991) (WESTLAW, Tenn. library).
74. 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-58 (1988).
75. Id.
76. For a detailed discussion of the judicial interpretations of the Medicare Anti-
Kickback Law, see Department of Health & Human Services, Departmental Appeals
Board, Civil Remedies Division, In the Case of Inspector General v. Hanlester
Network, No. C-186 through C-192, No. C-208, and C-213, 6-11, (May 8, 1990).
77. 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001) (proposing regulations
dealing with safe harbors to implement section 14 of PL100-93).
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harbors are issued there remains great ambiguity in the area.
In reviewing the anti-kickback law, and the controversies
and concerns over its application, it seems clear that the pri-
mary pattern of violation that the law anticipates falls into the
physician "gatekeeper" model.7' The government is concerned
about checking those arrangements that reward physicians for
referring Medicare-Medicaid patients to a particular institu-
tion. Exclusive contracting raises a reverse scenario in which a
hospital based specialist receives referrals from the institution,
and in turn, is required to remunerate the hospital in some
fashion for obtaining business. While the reverse kickback sit-
uation is not a primary focus of the law, it nevertheless
appears to fall within the ambit of the statute.79
Review of the literature dealing with exclusive contracts
indicates a common practice among hospitals to require certain
payments by hospital-based practitioners (anesthesiologists,
radiologists, pathologists) as a condition of the exclusive
arrangement.80 The payment requirements could entail
charges for rent, depreciation of equipment, maintenance fees,
housekeeping, franchise fees, administrative services, charita-
ble payments or payments for specific services. The key issue
in determining whether or not there is a statutory violation
concerns assessing the fair market value of the charge.8" It is
possible that a particular payment may be quite reasonable, in
keeping with the hospital's need to recover costs and to obtain
a return on investment. On the other hand, if the hospital's
charges exceed the value of their service there may be a viola-
tion of the Medicare law. Additional questions concerning
whether the services are needed, and whether such payments
are required of other physicians would also have to be
addressed. Those situations in which a percentage of profit or
billing over a certain level must be paid by the exclusive con-
tracting specialist raise the most likely scenarios for govern-
ment challenge.
78. Tarine, Hospital-MD Contracts: Fair Deals or Kickbacks?, AMERICAN MEDICAL
NEWS, March 16, 1990.
79. Opinion Letter of the Office of Inspector General DHHS, Sept. 26, 1989.
80. For example, see Tarine, supra at n.78; see also Freudenheim, Hospitals
Battling Specialists Over Revenues Testing, New York Times, at Al, col. 1., July 6,
1990.




There are currently two cases pending in which violations
of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Law have been raised in the
context of exclusive contracts. In the case of Virginia Radiol-
ogy Associates v. Culpeper Memorial Hospital,2 a group of
radiologists recently brought suit against a hospital for ending
their ten year exclusive arrangement with the institution. The
complaint alleges a breach of contract and a violation of Vir-
ginia antitrust law.83 While the suit is not a private attempt to
enforce the Medicare Anti-Kickback Law, the radiologists' con-
tention that they were required to purchase unnecessary and
illusory services to retain their contract raises the question of
improper kickbacks. In fact, Culpeper Memorial Hospital has
been the subject of a federal investigation of the radiologists'
contractual arrangements.84
If the Virginia court agrees with the radiologists' conten-
tion that the contractual requirement to pay Culpeper 50% of
the group's billings over a set dollar amount violates the Medi-
care law, it would go a long way to bolstering the physician's
case. The hospital, in turn, does not deny that it has estab-
lished financial requirements that must be met by the con-
tracting party. Rather, it argues that such requirements are
legitimate management charges.' The outcome of the Virginia
Radiology Associates's challenge probably will significantly
affect future cases. The requirements that Culpeper incorpo-
rated into its exclusive contract are not uncommon, and so the
court's reading of them will help other institutions in crafting
such arrangements.
In the case of US. v. Kensington Hospital,' recently filed
by the U.S. Justice Department, the government claimed that
the hospital and others associated with it had engaged in a
number of illegal activities violating the Anti-Kickback Law.
Among the series of alleged violations are four allegations that
a pathologist, radiologist, dentist, and a group of anesthesiolo-
82. Virginia Radiology Associates v. Culpeper, No. 90-L-172 (Circuit Court of
Culpeper County, Va., filed Aug. 8, 1990). See also Perry, Overpriced Billing Services
May Break Anti-Kickback Laws, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 30, 1990.
83. Culpeper, No. 90-L-172.
84. Perry, Virginia Legal Battle Highlights Unrest Between Hospitals, Physicians,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept. 17, 1990, at 34-36.
85. Id.
86. U.S. v. Kensington Hosp., No. 90-5430, (E. Dist. Pa., filed March 13, 1991). See
also McCormick, Kickback Law Used in Hospital Probe, AM. MED., Jan. 28, 1991, at 5.
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gists were required to pay kickbacks to the hospital as a condi-
tion of their exclusive contracts with Kensington. s7 On the
basis of the information presented in the Justice Department's
complaint, the required kickbacks were only a part of a much
larger pattern of illegal conduct by the hospital. From the
facts presented by the government it appears that the kickback
requirements, in the form of required donations, were far more
questionable than the management fees under dispute in Cul-
peper. In Kensington, it seems rather clear that the payments
demanded of the hospital based specialists were clearly a quid
pro quo for the privilege of having an exclusive franchise at
Kensington. As noted, a pivotal issue in determining the out-
come of these reverse kickback cases will be the guidelines laid
out by DHHS in the safe harbor regulations.
IV. REFOCUSING QUALITY ASSURANCE/UTILIZATION REVIEW
With the exception of an entirely closed medical staff,
most arrangements that limit access to staff membership do
not impact on a large number of physicians. For a hospital to
realize efficiencies in medical practice, it must develop medical
staff-wide policies that go beyond exclusive arrangements for
certain practitioners. There are currently several areas in
which hospitals are making efforts at developing and imple-
menting policies that result in greater cost efficiencies by med-
ical staffs. Such efforts range from widely accepted, and
universally pursued quality assurance/utilization review ("QA/
UR") strategies, to less accepted physician incentive programs,
to proposals that alter the credentialing processes to incorpo-
rate an economic evaluation. Like exclusive contracting and
closed departments, any alteration in the status quo between
hospitals and medical staffs must undergo careful legal scru-
tiny. This scrutiny is necessary because of the delicate nature
of the relationship between medical staff and hospital, and the
potential disruption to the facility when the relationship is
altered.
Perhaps the most general means in which a hospital
engenders efficient performance from its medical staff is
through quality assurance and utilization review.8 8 The major-
ity of medical staffs have rather involved QA and UR pro-
87. Complaint at 14-15, Kensington Hosp., No. 90-5430.




grams, in part, because of JCAHO (Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health Organizations) and state/federal law
mandates.89 But aside from meeting specific mandates, there is
a long-standing consensus that peer review activities focusing
on clinical performance evaluations, which in turn educate
physicians, are a way to enhance not only individual perform-
ance, but also overall institutional efficiency.
Of late, the evaluation of physician performance whether
through quality assurance or utilization review has undergone
significant changes. Hospitals are spending considerably more
time in assessing quality by creating more comprehensive qual-
ity assurance teams and by expanding evaluation considera-
tions to include such factors as patient satisfaction.' In
addition, various hospital programs have been designed to sen-
sitize physicians to the economic ramifications of clinical deci-
sion-making.9' Certain types of routine reviews such as blood
and drug usage have very strong economic implications in addi-
tion to their quality components.
A growing practice since the advent of Diagnostic Related
Groups (DRGs) has been the development of physician profil-
ing.92 Using data from more sophisticated hospital information
systems, institutions are able to assemble individual physician
profiles that detail admissions by type, length of stay, diagno-
sis, charges, and hospital reimbursement. 93 Individual physi-
cian practice profiles can, in turn, be compared with aggregate
profile data either from one hospital or from an entire region.
Clearly, physician profiles present a powerful tool for evaluat-
ing both clinical and economic performance in that they assem-
ble a unified data set that allows analysis of a physician's
entire practice in a particular facility for a given time period.
While use of profiles has been restricted to QA and UR activi-
ties, it is not unreasonable to see such data extended into the
credentialing area.
Increasing cost pressures on hospitals have spawned the
89. National Health Lawyers Association, Utilization Management, PROs and
Quality Assurance Seminar Materials (April 6-7, 1989).
90. Thompson, Exploring 12 Myths About Quality Assurance and Peer Review,
THE MED. STAFF COUNSELOR, Fall 1988, at 39-49.
91. See AMA COST EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION NETWORK: ECONOMIC GRAND
ROUNDS (1984).
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growth of analytical capabilities in the physician performance
area. In addition, the dramatic increase in information tech-
nology has played a vital role in the ability to assemble physi-
cian practice data that yields insightful portraits of economic
and clinical performance.' Hospitals are able to purchase or
develop software packages that allow them to accurately track
and measure physician performance and merge clinical and
financial data. 5 In at least one state, Pennsylvania, acute care
facilities have a legal mandate to report physician clinical data
to a governmental agency and, as part of the program, all hos-
pitals in the state are required to use the same software pack-
age." As physician-hospital data systems develop and improve,
it is clear that the barriers between hospital management and
medical staff will erode further. It is also clear that these
developments and improvements have given management a set
of new and powerful tools to enhance organizational efficiency
and to increase its ability to individually and collectively moni-
tor a medical staff.
The other side of the quality arena affecting hospitals con-
cerns the widespread efforts at developing clinical practice
guidelines, which are being conducted on national, regional,
and local levels by government, organized medicine, and indi-
vidual institutions.' The likely result of all this activity will
be that hospitals and medical staffs will be confronted with
multiple sets of guidelines in almost all areas of .practice.
Clearly, those who develop guidelines want them used. As a
result, these developers will pressure provider institutions to
adopt their new measures. For example, one specialty society,
the American College of Physicians, is encouraging hospitals to
use its clinical practice guidelines in credentialing.98
Not only are different sponsors drafting guidelines, but the
guidelines themselves, even in the same clinical areas, may be
quite different depending on what methodology was used in
94. 1d.
95. Mohlanbroek, Quality and Cost Effiiency Data to Support Physician's
Clinical Decisions, 5 QRC ADVISOR 4 (1989).
96. 40 PA. STAT. ANN. LIT. § 6125 (Purdon's Supp. 1990).
97. G. Young, Medical Practice Guidelines & Hospital Staff Privilege Decisions:
An Antitrust Perspective, (Unpublished manuscript) (available in Agency for Health
Policy & Research, Rockville, Md) (1990); see also Billings, The Emergence of Quality
as a Major Health Policy Issue in ROSCOE POUND FOUND., MED. QUALITY AND THE LAW
(1990), O'Leary, Beyond Generic Occurrance Screening, 265 J. A.M.A. 1993 (1991).
98. Hosp. CLINICAL PRIVILEGES: GUIDELINES FOR PROCEDURES IN GASTRO-
ENTEROLOGY AND NEPHROLOGY (American College of Physicians 1988).
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their development. Guidelines can be based on physician opin-
ions, on study of clinical evidence, on analysis of patient out-
comes, or on patient preferences.' Regardless of the type of
guideline, the issue of cost appropriateness and cost effective-
ness can be incorporated into recommendations of how physi-
cians should proceed.1" A hospital confronted with multiple
guidelines likely would be inclined to select the evaluation sets
that articulate the standards of practice reflecting appropriate
quality and would pay due deference to cost effectiveness
issues. Thus, a hospital can, by selecting appropriate evalua-
tion criteria, set the stage for QA and UR activities that pro-
mote medical staff cost efficient practices, and possibly carry
over such criteria into credentialing.
V. PHYSICIAN ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A NEW ANALYSIS
IN CREDENTIALING
The notion of evaluating physicians from an economic van-
tage point is one that is receiving increasing attention in the
context of medical staff credentialing.1'0 Analyzing a physi-
cian's economic performance in the medical staff appointment
and reappointment processes has been referred to as economic
credentialing.0° Significantly, the lack of a consensus on just
what economic credentialing is or how it should be conducted
has created difficulty in studying this evolving area of analysis.
There are currently two major ways to define economic
credentialing. 0 3 First, it is an extension of QA/UR processes
that focus on individual physician efficiency measures which
have economic ramifications. Such a process of economic
credentialing is clearly linked to ongoing quality reviews; when
extended into the appointment/reappointment area, it has not
been overly controversial. Data from both QA/UR have been
routinely used in credentialing either directly by the relevant
committees or by department chairs who make key recommen-
99. See generally Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Med, Care: The Policy
Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 777, 819 (1990).
100. Id.; Burda, Changing Physician Practice Patterns, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Feb. 17, 1989, at 18-25.
101. McCormick, HMSS Assails Use of Economic Criteria in Credentialing, AM.
MED. NEwS, Dec. 14, 1990; see also Eller & Teplitsky, Considering Economic Factors in
Hospital Privilege Decisions, 3 HEALTH SPAN 11-18, Aug.-Sept. 1986.
102. Id.
103. Blum, Economic Analysis of Physician Practices, THE MED. STAF7
COUNSELOR 25-30 (1991).
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dations in the process.1' 4
Second, the California Medical Association ("CMA") has
identified economic credentialing as a way to evaluate physi-
cians based strictly on bottom line measures that have no
direct relationship to quality.10 5 According to the CMA, factors
such as concurrent DRG review, revenue per physician, admis-
sion rates, payor mix, and community need for service have no
bearing on quality. Consequently, the CMA considers these
inappropriate grounds for evaluating and making staffing deci-
sions.1°6 Other economic measures, however, including varia-
104. J. Blum, Introducing Economic Factors into Credentialing, GOVERNANCE 100
LEADERSHIP PAPER SERIES 1991.
105. J. Rotenberg, Report to Council from the Taskforce on Exclusive Contracting
and Economic Credentialing (July 1990) (on file with the California Medical
Association.
106. Id.
The following are examples of economic criteria that do not apply to quality:
Concurrent DRG Review
Reimbursement Based on IDC-9 Code
Comparison to "Alternative" DRGs
Physician Profit by Reimbursement






Physician DRG Profiling Comparing Profitable DRG Categories to Nonprofitable
DEG Categories
Market Need For Particular Type of Physician
Allocation of Hospital Resources
Admission Rates
Number of Hospital-Owned Outpatient Services Utilized
Staff Development Plans






Hospital-Owned Ambulatory Facility Under Utilization
Age As A Development Rather Than Health Status Criterion
Patient Demographics
Use of Facilities In Order To Maximize Current, Projected or Desired Hospital
Market Share




Comparative Utilization of Hospitals
Promised Utilization of Inpatient Services
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tion studies (comparisons of resources used), number of tests
ordered, use of consultants/referrals, and DRG outliers do
have a quality nexus and, according to CMA, can be used in
credentialing. x° The CMA position, endorsed by the AMA's
Hospital Medical Staff Section, makes clear that the decision of
the economic-quality data used in appointment-reappointment
is within the purview of the medical staff, and not the hospital
corporation.1°s
Economic credentialing raises two levels of legal inquiry.
The first analysis focuses on whether a hospital can mandate
assessments of physician economic practice factors in either
appointment or reappointment. The second analysis, assuming
that economic credentialing is permissible, focuses on assess-
ment of specific legal problems it may create.
In determining the legal viability of economic credential-
ing, this proposed process must be placed within the broad con-
text of credentialing generally. The mandate that hospitals
possess in the appointment and reappointment area flows from
the institutional quality duty. Even prior to the seminal hospi-
tal case of Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital,'09 hos-
pitals have had a recognized legal duty to appoint and
Promised Utilization of Hospital Outpatient Services
107. Id.
The following are examples of economic data that may have quality ramifications:
Comparison of Numbers of Resources Used To (Variation Studies)
Number of Tests Ordered
Number of Hospital Admissions Vis a Vis Outpatient Services
Utilization
Comparative Profiles of Physician Outcomes and Resource
Utilization Within Same DRG Category
Number of Consultants/Referrals
DRG Outliers
108. See McCormick, supra note 101.
The following are examples of criteria which have validity for quality assurance
purposes:
Length of Stay
Disruption of Hospital Operations, As Pertains to Patient Care
Improper Use of Hospital Resources, As Pertains to Patient Care
Fraud and Abuse




Excessive and Redundant Testing
Clinically Unnecessary Treatment
High Length of Stay
Excessive Number of Denial Letters
109. 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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reappoint competent medical staff members." ° This creden-
tialing responsibility is firmly established in both common and
statutory law, as well as in the accreditation standards of
JCAHO."' For example, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida ruled that a hospital possessed a corporate obligation to
grant and continue providing medical staff privileges for quali-
fied individuals. The court held that failure to do so would
result in corporate liability." 2 In turn, Florida statutes impose
a legal responsibility on hospital boards to engage in creden-
tialing activities. In addition, these statutes create a limited
immunity for hospital boards while engaged in this process."'
Under the JCAHO accreditation standards, credentialing is a
shared process between the medical staff and the hospital
board that must be detailed in the medical staff's bylaws."14
While JCAHO and state law recognize the self-governing
medical staff model, credentialing is ultimately the legal
responsibility of the hospital trustees. Under a system of dele-
gation endorsed by JCAHO, standards and processes of
appointment and reappointment fall within the medical staff
ambit." The hospital board generally does not become overly
involved in the details of credentialing, but merely passes on
the results of the medical staff review. From a legal stand-
point, however, a hospital board could choose to manage, even
control, credentialing of physicians. Outside of accreditation
considerations, the barriers to having trustees "take over"
credentialing are raised more by institutional politics than by
law.
110. HAYT, HAir, & GROESCHEL, LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 133
(1972). In a certain sense, economic credentialing is a paradox in that it is both a
reverse trend, and an extension of hospital law emanating from Darling v. Charleston
Community Hospital. With Darling, and the law that flowed from it, hospitals broke
down the distinctions between management and medical practice, and as such
experienced an expanded legal duty for monitoring of medical care. With economic
credentialing, hospitals are reaching further into what organized medicine portrays as
a legally protected medical function, credentialing, thus expanding Darling on the one
hand. On the other hand, a physician economic analysis program, resting on corporate
legal power, is an attempt to make the credentialing process a function of hospital
administration, bringing it back into the management area.
111. C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 620-686 (1989); see also
JCAHO ACCREDITATION CRITERIA, supra note 25.
112. See Insinga v. Labella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989).
113. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.011(1)-(11), 395.0115(1) (1986); for
immunity, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.011(8) (1986).
114. See JCAHO ACCREDITATION CRITERIA, supra note 25 (note with particularity




California appears to be the only state in which there is a
legitimate debate about the scope of a hospital board's author-
ity vis-a-vis the medical staff. Under California law, the medi-
cal staff is given clear legal authority over professional work
performed in the hospital." 6 The line of demarcation between
board and medical staff has been further deepened with the
passage of the state Peer Review Law which establishes a
series of special safeguards for physicians adversely affected by
credentialing decisions." 7 The California law limits the ability
of the governing board to take action in credentialing
independent of the hospital medical staff's peer review
committee."
18
Even in California, however, the final authority in creden-
tialing rests with the board. While one could argue that a Cali-
fornia hospital board may not be able to independently deny a
physician appointment or reappointment, clearly the trustees
bear ultimate legal liability for these decisions. In Mateo-
Woodburn v. Fresno Community Hospital,"9 the appellate
court recognized the medical staff's credentialing role, but
clearly indicated that the staff only has power to make recom-
mendations and that final membership decisions are those of
the board. 20
In view of the final authority of the board in credentialing,
an interesting question arises about whether a hospital board
could implement a physician economic credentialing program
independent of the medical staff. The answer is contingent to
a significant degree on how one defines economic credential-
ing. If one views economic credentialing as an extension of
quality assurance/utilization review into the appointment and
reappointment area, it may not be feasible for the board to
usurp this function. As noted, the board has final say in
credentialing, but the tradition of delegating the actual review
process is strongly buttressed by JCAHO, state law, and the
policies of organized medicine. A board applying economic cri-
teria to evaluate physicians independent of the medical staff
could be viewed, at least, as an inappropriate interference.
Indeed, under California law, it may even be classified as
illegal.
116. CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 70701(e)(1)(F) (1991).
117. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809-809.9 (West 1989).
118. Id. at § 809.05.
119. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1169, 270 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1990).
120. Id. at 1188-89, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
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The legal analysis changes, however, with a different defi-
nition. If economic credentialing is seen, not as an extension of
a traditional medical staff quality or utilization review process,
but as a separate, unique analysis, different from medical staff
credentialing review, it may be defended more easily. In fact,
to distance such analysis from medical staff credentialing, a
board may choose to refer to such review in non-credentialing
terminology. Politically, establishing a second tier of review
for staff membership may be difficult. However, as the final
decision makers in staffing matters, the board has the power to
amend hospital bylaws to allow for such a review. Buttressing
this position is the economic reality of the hospital business
with which the board, as a fiscal fiduciary, must deal. It seems
appropriate for trustees, as fiscal fiduciaries, to review the eco-
nomic performance of individual physicians who exert control
over the hospital's business performance. In fact, one could
argue that the failure of a board to consider economic issues in
appointing and reappointing physicians to a medical staff vio-
lates a legal mandate to engage in necessary fiscal oversight. 21
By viewing economic analysis of individual physician prac-
tices as being distinct from medical staff credentialing
processes, a couple of interesting issues arise. First, on a paro-
chial level, the California law which so strongly supports the
independent medical staff as the situs for credentialing may be
circumvented.2 2 By separating economic analysis from tradi-
tional credentialing, the board is implementing a process that
has never been performed by a medical staff, and falls outside
the staff's quality monitoring function. If the board can make
distinctions between business and quality measures, then it
need not exclude bottom line factors in an alternative analysis
of physician efficiency.
A second issue raised by recasting economic credentialing
as a review different from traditional medical staff review is
the question of immunity under federal law. Under the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,12 hospital peer review
has provided a limited immunity from federal antitrust liabil-
ity. The immunity, however, is applicable to situations dealing
with the various reviews that are oriented to insuring quality
medical care as provided in the hospital. If economic creden-
121. See discussion supra note 110.
122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. 1988).
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tialing focuses only on bottom line measures, it would not be
classified as a type of quality review and would thus, not qual-
ify for the federal immunity. 24 Such activity may, however,
receive protection under state law. For example, Illinois law
creates an absolute immunity for peer review activities that
appear to be broad enough to include economic analysis of phy-
sician practices, even if it is a process separate from traditional
credentialing review. 2 ' Thus, however economic credentialing
is defined, it appears that the process is legally justified in that
the weight of hospital law rests more with the board than with
the medical staff in the credentialing area.
VI. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING
Assuming that economic credentialing is legally appropri-
ate, certain antitrust implications arise. Typically, medical
staff antitrust challenges fall within Section 1 of the Sherman
Act."2 Section 1 violations involve illegal restraints of trade of
some form, such as conspiracy, group boycott, or concerted
refusal to deal. Within the context of economic credentialing,
one could easily foresee a scenario in which a medical staff or
hospital used economic criteria as a way to inappropriately
exclude a physician from staff membership for competitive
reasons.
However, constructing an antitrust case in the medical
staff context is not easily done. Section 1 violations are either
classified as a per se violation or as a rule of reason violation,
depending on the conduct in question. The majority of medical
staff antitrust challenges fall under the so-called rule of reason
analysis.127 It is the rare case in which a per se or automatic
violation of antitrust law is found in medical staff cases
because the requisite elements are generally not present. In
fact, courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to apply the
per se rule, particularly where the alleged anticompetitive con-
duct can be justified on the basis of quality care.128 In one of
the more noteworthy exceptions, Weiss v. York Hospital,'
124. Blum, Economic Credentialing: A New Twist in Hospital Appraisal
Processes, - J. LEGAL MED. - (in press) (1991).
125. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 111 1/2 151.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1991).
127. See Blumstein & Sloan, Antitrust & Hospital Peer Review, 51 LAW CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (Spring 1988).
128. Id. at 53-56.
129. 745 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 1984).
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the Third Circuit found that a medical staff's refusal to deal
with the plaintiff, an osteopathic physician, was a group boy-
cott and thus, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. i13
Under the more typical rule of reason analysis, several fac-
tors must be demonstrated. These include the existence of a
conspiracy, the impact of the conspiracy on the relevant mar-
ket, and the lack of an appropriate rationale for discriminating
against the plaintiff."3' The issue of conspiracy is complicated
by the uncertainties of whether a court will recognize a hospi-
tal and its medical staff as economically distinct entities. In
the alternative, the medical staff itself has been viewed as a
combination of individuals with disparate interests, and thus,
capable of conspiring among itself.132 Proof of conspiracy
raises interesting evidentiary challenges. In Bolt v. Halifax,13
the Eleventh Circuit noted that few medical staff conspiracies
can be proven with direct evidence. Relying on circumstantial
evidence, a conspiracy would have to be proven as inuring eco-
nomic benefit to the defendants, and excluding possibilities
that co-conspirators acted independently in a manner consis-
tent with business objectives."
If an economic credentialing challenge is analyzed under a
rule of reason analysis, defendants would more than likely
argue that use of such criteria is justified by operation effi-
ciency requirements; such an argument is difficult for a plain-
tiff to overcome. Legitimate business reasons are valid
grounds for defense of practices that may result in economic
injury to certain individuals.3 5 Institutions adopting economic
criteria for analyzing physician appointment and reappoint-
ment could make a convincing case for doing so on business
grounds. As such, without strong and somewhat unique factors
underlying a conspiracy, an antitrust challenge would be
frustrated.
While the very process of peer evaluation using economic
criteria may raise concerns about antitrust, those concerns
don't easily materialize into an illegal action. Economic
credentialing does not inherently create antitrust problems.
130. Id. at 820.
131. See Blumstein & Stone, supra note 128, at 52.
132. Id. at 59-65.
133. 851 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1989).
134. See Blumstein & Stone, supra note 125, at 52.




And, when misused, it is really no different than misapplica-
tion of any other type of evaluation criteria that stymies com-
petition. Economic efficiency measures could fall outside
defensible bounds if targeted at a particular individual, but
such a possibility is not highly probable. If economic guide-
lines used in credentialing do not meet legitimate institutional
objectives they could be viewed as suspect, and a possible sub-
terfuge for anticompetitive behavior.
A hospital could generate antitrust problems if the eco-
nomic criteria it uses are not based on verifiable evidence, but
only on arbitrary standards. In Friedman v. Delaware Memo-
rial Hospital, 36 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania confronted an antitrust challenge
regarding the scientific merits of medical criteria for a certain
procedure. While the court found the criteria valid, commen-
tators have suggested that a finding of invalidity would raise
questions about inappropriate use and would clearly diminish a
defense that use of the criteria was justified even if it led to
economic injury.137 Proof that a particular economic standard
was not formally or routinely applied, but rather, was used on
an ad hoc basis, could raise legitimate concerns about inappro-
priate motives and would support a viable antitrust challenge.
Any of the factors noted that might lead to questioning a
hospital's motives in the adoption and implementation of eco-
nomic criteria merely open the door of inquiry into the anti-
trust context. Without the necessary findings to establish a
rule of reason violation, ad hoc use of institutionally incompati-
ble economic criteria or arbitrary guidelines do not, in and of
themselves, lead to a violation of law. In addition, as previ-
ously noted, any antitrust challenge in the medical staff area
should be reviewed in reference to possible immunity protec-
tions under state and federal law.
VII. NEW STANDARDS FOR ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING
Whenever new legal standards are utilized as a vehicle to
evaluate performance, legal problems can be anticipated. In
the case of economic credentialing, hospitals will need to either
develop or adopt new sets of criteria for evaluating physician
financial performance. A physician whose staff privileges have
been adversely affected by new economic criteria likely will
136, 672 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
137. See G. Young, supra note 97.
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challenge those baselines as being inappropriate on one or
more grounds.
Much of the discussion about new health care criteria has
focused on the adoption of clinical practice standards at medi-
cal malpractice trials." s The prime consideration in judicial
use of new practice criteria deals with a range of procedural
issues impacting admissibility of evidence."3 9 Provided it is
directly relevant, courts likely will admit new economic crite-
ria into evidence at trial.
The attitude that courts adopt regarding the propriety of
judging physician performance on economic grounds generally
will color the fate of economic criteria at trial. If a court views
economic credentialing as a legitimate business inquiry, eco-
nomic criteria probably will not fare any differently than other
new sets of criteria. On the other hand, if a court adopts the
position that a physician's privileges should only be evaluated
by use of traditional quality standards, the newly adopted eco-
nomic criteria may be subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny.
While the advocates in a given case, as well as state hospital
law precedent, will color a court's attitude, it seems safe to pre-
dict that the judicial reaction to economic criteria will not be
universally favorable. Regardless of judicial attitude, hospitals
must be prepared to justify economic criteria with proof of
how they were developed and applied.
As economic credentialing develops, hospitals, as in the
QA and UR areas, likely will be able to utilize regionally or
nationally developed criteria as a basis for their evaluations. It
is difficult to determine whether such criteria will be viewed
more favorably by a court than will economic guidelines for
physician practices that are institution-specific and locally
developed. In the abstract, a case could be made that national/
regional criteria ought to be more valid in that they are based
on a larger statistical sample. But hospital economics are
reflective of a local area market and, as such, may be more
accurately represented by individually tailored criteria.
The critical issue involving criteria will not be local versus
national, but rather the specific content and manner of applica-
138. See Kinney & Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice
Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1989).
139. Schockemoehl, Admissibility of Written Criteria As Evidence of the
Standard of Care in Medical and Hospital Negligence Actions in Virginia, 18 U. RICH.
L. REV. 725 (1984).
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tion given to the standards. 40 The validity of the methodology
underlying the criteria, the legitimacy of the economic base-
lines, and the appropriateness of application in a given case are
all grounds on which economic criteria could be challenged.
As economic credentialing becomes an established process, the
legal challenges more likely will focus on application of spe-
cific criteria in that questions of methodological appropriate-
ness would be answered in the initial cases that deal with
economic criteria.
Another possible area of challenge, depending upon the
specific criteria, is vagueness. If particular criteria establish
only broad guidelines, a physician might argue that such crite-
ria are too general to serve as a basis for an adverse decision,
or don't provide adequate notice of expected performance. In
balance, it appears that economic criteria, if fundamentally
sound, would be able to sustain legal challenges.
VIII. ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING: A MODEL
Beyond a theoretical analysis of the legal impact of physi-
cian practice economic criteria, there are almost no working
models from which to draw. To date, only one hospital pro-
gram has been documented in the literature.' 41 The physician
economic efficiency program used by Harford Hospital in
Havre de Grace, Maryland has been in place since 1987.
Harford has developed a four part economic efficiency criteria
screen in areas that the hospital felt were most significant to
institutional viability.1z The evaluation criteria include days
above standard, charges above standard, denials for inappropri-
ate utilization, and medical malpractice. 4 Each of the respec-
tive criteria screens rests on objective measures. For example,
the basis for determining days above standard is derived from
the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission data
that lays out case mix adjusted average lengths of stay for the
state.'"
Under the Harford system, if a practitioner is found defi-
cient in two or more of the criteria screens, a second set of cri-
140. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
141. Cantrell & Flick, Physician ifficiency and Reimbursement A Case Study,
Hosp. AND HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 43-50, (1986); Hartford Memorial Hospital
Summary of Economic Efficiency Criteria, 1989.
142. See Cantrell & Flick, supra note 141, at 44-45.
143. Id. at 45-46.
144. Id. at 45.
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teria are applied. The supplemental criteria include analysis of
outpatient ancillary service charges, and medical record docu-
mentation. 45 In conjunction with the economic efficiency
analysis, the hospital has devreloped a counseling protocol that
affords staff members opportunities to improve their individual
economic efficiency. A physician who deviates from the
screens is provided with several opportunities to remedy his or
her behavior prior to being subjected to reduction or removal
of staff privileges. Interestingly, the final economic review and
action taken is within the discretion of hospital management,
not the medical staff, and the program itself has been written
into Harford's corporate bylaws."
While it is difficult to generalize on the basis of one model,
the Harford physician economic efficiency program does pro-
vide some guidance as to how economic criteria can be incorpo-
rated into a formal evaluation program. Economic criteria, as
quality criteria, probably will not be applied in a cookbook for-
mat. Rather, economic analysis will mirror quality review
methodology with a use of screens that will evaluate perform-
ance and will trigger further review and analysis if problems
are uncovered. Such a process will entail ongoing contact
between reviewers and physicians. Also, economic analysis
programs will need to develop remedial processes prior to
sanction. A more rigid approach to economic credentialing
would engender significant resistance by medical staff,
JCAHO, and perhaps even the courts.
IX. LESSONS FROM CASE LAW
A review of case law does not as yet uncover any reported
decisions dealing explicitly with economic credentialing. As
this very new concept evolves, it likely will be the subject of
judicial challenge. For the present, however, there is a small
body of case law involving physician loss or reduction of staff
privileges that may prove helpful. In this group of cases, the
hospital's conduct rested, at least in part, on the physician's
exceeding utilization review guidelines that have strong finan-
cial implications, and, as such, have relevance to economic
credentialing.
In Knapp v. Palos Community Hospital,'47 which is repre-
145. Id. at 47.
146. Id. at 45.
147. 125 Ill. App. 3d 244, 465 N.E. 2d 554 (1984).
[Vol. 14:561
Hospital-Medical Staff Relations
sentative of legal actions where physicians' practices are called
into question through quality review, a group of physicians
challenged the curtailment of their medical staff privileges on
multiple grounds.148 The hospital based its conduct against the
doctors on quality assurance reviews that revealed serious util-
ization problems. Specifically, reviews uncovered a pattern of
both inappropriate utilization and overutilization of lung scans
and medications, excessive use of diagnoses, and improper test-
ing and treatment. 149 While the areas noted raised major qual-
ity problems, the hospital was also concerned because the
disciplined physicians' costs were 31% higher than those of
other staff members."5 The cost problems clearly mirrored
quality of care difficulties, but if cost was not affected by poor
practices the hospital may not have been as motivated to take
negative credentialing actions against the plaintiff doctors.
In the case of Rao v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital,'5 ' a physician
challenged his summary suspension from the medical staff,
seeking to enjoin the hospital's conduct. The hospital execu-
tive committee took action against the plaintiff because an
extensive review of the physician's charts demonstrated seri-
ous utilization problems. 52  The executive committee
presented evidence indicating a pattern of inappropriate use of
laboratory procedures, particularly EKGs and glucose toler-
ance tests. Cost was not an issue in Rao, but clearly, since such
behavior is not cost effective and can also result in payment
denials, the physician's practice demonstrated a pattern of
abuse having a negative financial impact on the hospital.
In Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hospital,
5 3
the previously noted antitrust case, the plaintiff was excluded
from the staff for overutilizing bronchoscopes, and for refusing
to adhere to the recommendations of the hospital's utilization
review committee. In a very exhaustive discussion of facts, the
federal district court never directly mentioned the cost impli-
cations of the plaintiff physician's behavior. Cost, however,
was a very real factor in the hospital's revocation of Dr. Fried-
man's privileges. The hospital formed a special medical staff
endoscopy committee for the purpose of reviewing the plain-
148. Id. at 257, 465 N.E.2d at 564.
149. Id. at 252, 465 N.E.2d at 560.
150. Id. at 251, 465 N.E.2d at 560.
151. 140 Ill. App. 3d 442, 488 N.E.2d 685 (1986).
152. Id. at 444-45, 488 N.E.2d at 687.
153. 672 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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tiff.1 5 4 In doing so, the hospital was responding, in part, to
audit deficiencies raised by Blue Cross of Greater Philadel-
phia.155  Blue Cross auditors felt that Dr. Friedman, and
another physician at Delaware County, were performing an
unnecessarily high number of unjustified bronchoscopes.
Clearly, the conclusions of Blue Cross have direct economic
implications: third party payors do not reimburse for unneces-
sary procedures. One could reasonably conclude, therefore,
that the entire scenario involving Dr. Friedman's unorthodox
use of bronchoscopes, while reflecting quality problems, had
very strong financial repercussions attached to it.
The only action in which a court has explicitly upheld eco-
nomic credentialing is the New Jersey lower court case of
Edelman v. JFK Hospital."s In Edelman, the hospital's utiliza-
tion review program found that the plaintiff physician's
lengths of stay exceeded acceptable norms, even when the ages
of his patients were taken into account. In addition, the plain-
tiff demonstrated a pattern of excessive and unnecessary use of
diagnostic tests. The hospital based its decision to deny Dr.
Edelman's reappointment to the medical staff on his utilization
problems, which as a result of payment denials, cost the facility
over a quarter of a million dollars.'57
Dr. Edelman challenged JFK's conduct on the grounds
that it violated his due process rights.158 The New Jersey
Superior Court rejected the plaintiff's challenge and ruled that
the credentialing action taken by the board was appropriate. 5 9
The court held that it was the board's duty to see that the
institution was run in an orderly and efficient manner. Signifi-
cantly, the court did not reject the notion that a physician be
judged on economic grounds." ° While Edelman may be closer
to an economic credentialing decision than the other cases, pre-
viously noted, it still is a situation where quality and cost are
tightly intertwined. In fact, the case is not really a classic
example of economic credentialing, but rather of utilization
review applied in the credentialing context.
154. Id. at 183.
155. Id.
156. N.J. Sup. Ct., No. C-2104-80 (1982); cert. denied, 96 N.J. 289, 475 A.2d 585
(1984). See also Economic Credentialing is Fine for Tightrope Walkers, 15 HOsP. PEER
REVIEW 4, 1990.






There are a number of cases in which hospitals have made
adverse credentialing decisions based on economic or business
factors. For example, in the case of Maltz v. New York Univer-
sity Medical Center,'' the Medical Center rejected a staff
application on the basis that the institution lacked the physical
capacity. A New York appellate court upheld the hospital's
decision, finding that the hospital was entitled to broad discre-
tion.'6 2 In other cases, courts have upheld hospital policies
allowing removal of physicians from the medical staff for fail-
ure to admit a requisite number of patients annually.'63 Such
decisions, however, constitute enforcement of hospital policies
that have fiscal ramifications, but are not the result of a review
of individual physician practices using financial guidelines.
While related, the cases discussed herein do not deal spe-
cifically with economic credentialing. Nevertheless, courts will
likely support hospital credentialing decisions that stem from
quality problems having very clear cost implications. The cost
issues may have driven the hospital's action but as long as the
action has a quality rationale, it will be accepted by the courts.
Thus, if economic credentialing is seen merely as an extension
of QA/UR, the courts probably will uphold such a process.
The real question is whether the courts will allow exclusion or
expulsion of physicians based on an institutional judgment that
costs of beneficial care are excessive. This question assumes, as
does the California Medical Association, that a distinction can
be made between quality of care and bottom line factors. One
could argue that a strict bottom line measure, such as revenue
per physician, ultimately impacts on institutional efficiency
and, as such, affects quality.
Two competing bodies of law must be balanced when
addressing the legal viability of economic credentialing. First
is law drawn from state common and statutory sources, cou-
pled with JCAHO accreditation criteria. This line buttresses
the self-governing medical staff's power in credentialing. Sec-
ond are legal principles, also from state common and statutory
sources, which bolster the hospital's corporate legal power in
credentialing and business policy decision-making. Apparently,
greater legal authority rests with hospitals than with medical
161. 121 A.D.2d 323, 503 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1986).
162. Id. at 571.
163. Jackaway v. Northern Dutchess Hosp., 139 A.D.2d 599, 526 N.Y.S. 599 (1988).
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staffs. Thus, economic credentialing generated by the hospital
is legally defensible.
Five factors make the argument for economic credential-
ing compelling. First, hospitals, even in California, have the
final authority to make credentialing decisions, and the law
has never specified what criteria be used in so doing. Second,
the hospital corporation bears the legal liability for inappropri-
ate credentialing decisions, not the medical staff. Third, hospi-
tal boards have a legal duty to act as fiscal fiduciaries. That
duty, stemming from the first two factors, creates a mandate to
make decisions in the best financial interests of the institution.
If a physician practices medicine in a way that hurts the hospi-
tal economically, the board, particularly in a highly competi-
tive market, has a responsibility to take action.
Fourth, a review of hospital case law clearly shows that
the courts have upheld and supported the right of management
to make decisions either that are in the public interest, or that
reflect sound business policies. Finally, economic analysis of
physicians is arguably a necessary activity in competitive situa-
tions, and that protecting the viability of a hospital's operation
is in the public interest. While these five factors collectively
support the legal underpinnings of economic credentialing and
are persuasive, they do not make the political and logistical
task of implementing such a program an easy one to
accomplish.
X. CONCLUSION
In the future, there likely will be considerable debate over
any strategy a hospital pursues that attempts to alter the medi-
cal staff status quo. In particular, strategies that infringe on
traditional staff functions, such as credentialing, will undoubt-
edly lead to controversy and litigation. The notion of measur-
ing physician practices in a hospital setting is not a foreign one.
However, allowing the measures to be economic and the evalu-
ators to be administrators and trustees is a clear departure
from tradition.
Market realities for the hospital industry will require dra-
matic operational changes and, in the context of the two hospi-
tal strategies reviewed here, limiting access to staff
membership and economic credentialing, the law is supportive.
In the case of exclusive contracts and closed departments, legal
precedent provides that schemes buttressed by sound rationale
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will be difficult to alter without identifying major legal flaws.
In the case of economic credentialing, there are more potential
legal issues that must be confronted. But here too, the weight
of the law creates a persuasive case in defense of such review-
ing practices.
Hospitals can not realize progress in achieving physician
efficiencies if such attempts become focal points of struggles
between medical staff and management. As long as the struc-
ture of a hospital corporation is not altered or the system of
health delivery itself is not changed, the key parties in the hos-
pital will need to cooperate in order for effective changes to
occur. Hospital administration must recognize the need for
medical staff agreement in exclusive contracting and in eco-
nomic credentialing and must only proceed independently in
these areas with great caution.
